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Stephen L. Elkin introduced the concept of "urban regime. " In brief, Elkin's 
conceptualization tied together land use interests , city politicians, and functional bureaucracies in 
a theory of urban politics. Elkin argued that over time , land use interests in a city wou ld seek 
policy outcomes which would further urban development and reduce pub lic disputes. Thus, the 
land use interests sought stable alliances with city politicians. In turn , city politicians looked for 
the steady allegiance of blocks of voters . The bureaucracies, which delivered the city serv ices , 
responded to the land use alliance on issues deemed essential for promoting the economic position 
of the city (Elkin, 1985 used the example of the distr ibution of police serv ices). The essence of 
the reg ime idea is that dominant coalitions, over periods of time , decide policy and provide a 
vision for the city . 
The regime concept has been used by several scholars of urban politics. Todd Swanstrom 
argues that regime theory can integrate the insights of urban economics with the insights of urban 
po litics. Swanstrom believes that "a theory of urban regimes can capture the variety of urban 
po litics while still achiev ing a useful level of generalization " (1988 :107-108) . Swanstrom 
(1988:108) proposes that we focus on "the tension between economic and political logic in the 
formation of state policy. " For Swans trom , the type of regime developed in a city will be 
determined by economic pressures, capital accumulation, and class composition. In addition, 
polit ical leadership and its values will influence the nature of the regime. 
The essays in Stone and Sanders (1987) operate from a regime paradigm. In 
summarizing the themes of these papers , Stone observes that "politics matters .. .. that politics is 
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shaped profoundly by the interrelationship between state and market. . .and that we need 
. r J Y 
appropriate and realistic criter ia to judge policies and political practices II (Stone and Sanders , VJb--::t 
1987: 17-18). Subsequently Stone , focusing on who is guiding development policy and to what 
effect, presents a typology of regime types (Stone and Sanders , 1987:272-273). The first type, 
the corporate regime, is one in which private interests--Iarge downtown businesses--p lay a major 
role in guiding develop ment policy with the effect that public authority and resources are used to 
subsidize investment. Elkin's (1987:25-5 1) description of Dallas provides one example. It is 
suggested that Atlanta (Reed , 1987), Baltimore (Stoker, 1987), and New York (Shefter , 1985; 
Pecorella, 1987; Doig, 1987; and Savitch, 1988) also follow the corporate reg ime pattern . 
The second type , the progressive regime , is less familiar to us in the United States. In a 
progressive regime, middle- and lower-cl ass neighborhood groups playa major role in policy-
making. When dominant, a progressive regime will expand services , pursue redistributive 
policies, and, perhaps , limit growth and place controls on land developers. Body-Gendrot 's 
description of Paris ' 13th arrondissement is one example (see Stone and Sanders, 1987:125- 143). 
In his Prog ress ive Cities, Pierre Clavel gives American examples: Hartford, Berkeley, Burlington 
and Santa Monica. Cities such as Boston and San Francisco have also been progressive on 
occasion. Examples from outside the United States are more common. We think of such 
progressive British local governments as Liverpool (Park inson, et aI., 1988) and Sheffield (Baker 
and Carlson, 1987) , and the Dore administration in Montreal , Canada (Leonard and Leveillee, 
1986). 
Finally, Stone presents a third type: the caretaker regime. In a caretaker regime , small 
businesses and homeowners constra in city governments in policy-making. When dominant, 
caretaker regimes will rely on the market and do as little as possible, while minimizing taxes , 
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government expenditures, and government activity. Sanders' (1987) case study of Kalamazoo, 
Michigan, is a classic example of a caretaker regime. As we shall see below, New Orleans also 
exemplified a caretaker regime for many years. 
First it should be noted that no city will precisely fit a particular category . Most cities 
evidence characteristics of more than one type but appear to be predominantly characterized by a 
part icular regime. Second, one must always bear in mind that typologies , such as the urban 
regime scheme, do not ensure good theory , rather that good theory allows one to construct 
accurate and insightful typologies. Such typologies allow us to communicate and/or distill 
complex situations into theoretical shorthand. We find it easier to manipulate these concepts and 
their relationships. Thus we can conceptually isolate the necessary relationships and alter the 
contingent ones in order to rethink the implications of alternative empirical conjunctures. This 
theoretical manipulation is best done in tandem with empirical evaluat ion in a recursive fashion. 
This is the exercise of this paper. 
Recently urban reg ime theory in particular and the "new urban politics" in general have 
come under attack for being theoretically undeveloped (Cox, 1991a, 1991b, also see Stone, 1991 
and Fainstein, 1991 for their rejoinders). Basically, Cox is transfe rring debates in geography 
(see Antipode and Society and Space concern ing epistemology and methodology in what has been 
called the new "locality studies") to the new urban politics literature. I Cox's most telling point is 
that descriptive concepts must be developed rationally and interpreted and, if necessary, 
respecified using higher-level abstractions. Cox claims that "new urban politics" concepts (e.g., 
the growth coalition, growth machine, and urban regime) have not been critically examined in 
light of the higher-level abstractions of his choice, the state and the structure of capital. 2 It is our 
reading of this literatu re that these concepts from the "new urban politics" are concrete 
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representations at the local scale of the higher-level abstraction "the state," paying particular 
attention to the changing structure of capital (e.g. , see Swanstrom, 1985 and Logan and Molotch, 
1987). More clearly stated, we feel that Cox's point is that he does not agree with the 
specification of these concepts in the literature he cites. 
In many instances we share Cox 's unease. Rather than attempt to respecify these 
concepts by reviewing other scholars' research with all the caveats that would create, it is the 
purpo se of this paper to describe and analyze the nature of the New Orleans urban regime 
focusing on the first term of Sidney Barthelemy, the second black mayor of New Or leans (1986­
1990). First, we believe that regime theory has been unspecified particularly in relation to racial 
politics. Thus we begin by discussing the changing relationship of blacks to the prevailing New 
Orleans regime. Second, since we agree with Cox (1991a) that Stone ' s regime typology is 
undertheorized in terms of the structure of capital and the role of the state in its interpretatio n of 
growth coalitions, we will pay particular attention to the role of the "consensus seeking para­
apparatus" (see Clark and Dear , 1984) in policy development. Finally, we feel that the 
relationship between the structure of the electoral coalition and the stability of the governing 
regime has been undertheorized in urban regime theory . In the concluding section, we 
summarize our version of a theoretically reconstructed urban regime theory. 
Blacks an d the New Orleans Regime 
Blacks in New Orleans have played a role in electoral politics for over a century. As 
early as the turn of the century, blacks (mainly Creoles of color) had some influence in local 
elections. That influence was weakened by the passage of Jim Crow laws in the 1920s. In the 
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1940s, a time of deep divisions within the white power structure and hotly contested elections, 
blacks were successful in gaining some access to the political system. Yet, as in the rest of the 
South , significant electoral part icipation by blacks did not occur until the passage of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. By the late 1960s, blacks were an influential element within the electoral 
coalition, and as such, created the opportunity for change within the urban regime. 
Even so, politics within the black community continued to reflect the historical and 
cultural distinction between the major groups: those of an Anglicized heritage and those of a 
French heritage (who later became known as Creoles of color) . Since antebellum days, the 
Creoles of color represented a large, articulate and often well-to-do free black population. 
During the period of Federal occupation and Reconstruction, the black Creoles were able to 
secure their political and civil rights . Many local leaders of the Civil Rights Movement of the 
1950s and 1960s were Creoles who sought to regain the rights they had won, and lost, 75 years 
earlier. The divisions within the black community have weakened their power vis-a-vis the 
governing coalition. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 had an immediate impact on the black political landscape 
in two ways: First was an increase in black electorate, from 17.5 percent in 1964 to 25.2 
percent in 1966; and second, the creation of black political organizations. These organizations 
served to institutionalize and strengthen the black vote. The two major organ izations formed at 
this time were the Southern Organization for Unified Leadership (SOUL), a political offshoot of 
the national Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Community Organizat ion for Urban 
Politics (COUP), a more conservative group formed in the black Creo le stronghold of the 7th 
Ward. These groups served as intermediaries to broker the black vote and became convenient 
channels for white politicians to gain access to blacks (Hirsch , 1992a: 57). 
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In 1969 the major black organizations endorsed councilman-at-large Maurice "Moon" 
Landrieu for mayor. His opponent in the runoff, Jimmy Fitzmorris, refused to appeal to black 
voters. Landrieu won with 90 percent of the black vote and a minority of white votes; black 
turnout was 75 percent. Landrieu's success in garnering the black vote ensured that black 
political organizations would be viewed as major players whose influence would be felt in the 
highest levels of local government. 
Landrieu was well-known to blacks long before he ran for mayor . As a freshman state 
legislator in 1960-6 1, he opposed (virtually alone) the segregationists at every tum during the 
school integration crisis. As leader in the City Council (1965-69) , he responded to black needs . 
Once in power Landrieu used the political process to open up opportunities for blacks. 
He increased the number of blacks in civil service jobs from 19.4 percent in 1970 when Landrieu 
took office to 43 percent in 1978 when he left office (Hirsch , 1992a:61-68). He named the city's 
first black Chief Administrative Officer (Terrence Duvernay). And he appointed several blacks as 
department heads, including Sidney Barthelemy to the Welfare Department. 3 Landrieu also was 
successful at providi ng significant patronage to blacks. 
As Hirsch has suggested, "Landrieu was able to offer new opportunities to blacks without 
grievously antagonizing whites because he was cutting large new slices off an expanding 
economic pie" (Hirsch , 1992a:74). The pie expanded because of Landrieu's abilities to bring 
significant federal revenues into the city. In order to do this, Landrieu had first to convince the 
city's elite that it was appropriate to receive federal dollars: that federal aid was no longer to be 
seen as an intrusion by the federa l government into local affairs. Much of this aid was 
antipoverty funds that he funneled through predominantly black channels, especially Total 
Community Action (TCA). State funds were also forthcomi ng following Edwin Edwards' 
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election as governor in 1971, with the help of black voters. Especially important for the 
patronage that could be dispensed was the development of the Louisiana Superdome , a state 
facility , which opened in New Orleans in 1975. The publicly financed Superdome was the 
catalyst for the multibillion dollar pr ivate investment that transformed the central business district 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. It was in the ear ly 1970s that a significant influx of 
outside capital began to penetrate New Orleans . Growth was so strong under Landrieu ' s 
administrat ion that a Growth Management Program for the downtown area was developed and 
instituted (see Brooks and Young, 1981). 
In 1977 a black Creo le, Ernest "Dutch" Moria l, a State Appeals Court Judge, was elected 
mayor. Morial won by only 5,471 votes; he garnered 97 percent of the black vote and 19 
percent of the white vote (mostly affluent Uptowners) , but not the support of most of the 
established black leadership (Hirsch, 1992a:83-85). Most of the black political organizations saw 
Morial as a spoiler who did not condone political patronage. Therefore they threw their lot in 
with liberal white candidates who might be more forthcoming with patronage. Morial defeated 
the liberal whites during the primaries and then went on to the runoff and defeated Joseph 
DiRosa, a conservative, white city councilman. 
In a major speech just prior to his inauguration, Morial called for a revision of public 
pr iorities, a retooling of public-private partnerships that would enlist pr ivate resources for public 
ends, and a reinvigorated, power ful ro le for the mayor (whom , he said, had a citywide mandate 
to assert the public interest). He promised to bring new personnel into city government on the 
basis of "intellect and public dedication regardless of race, creed or national or igin ... [I] have no 
intention of politicizing the incoming administrat ion on narrow grounds of reverse discrimination" 
(Perry and Stokes, 1987:229) . 
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Morial's early appointments reflected his emphasis on merit, not obligation. For 
example, some of his mid-level appointments were recent graduates of Harvard ' s Kennedy School 
of Government, where he was a fellow before his inauguration. Morial tried to curtail patronage 
and thus most of the established black political organizations lost access to the kind of patronage 
they had enjoyed during the Landr ieu years. Morial also tr ied to crack the entrenched bastions of 
white privilege and power by demanding free and open access to the public's business across-the­
board . 
Morial's assertion of a primary role for the office of mayor (in the past the mayor was 
not considered one of the influentials in the city) brought him into conflict with the city's social 
and economic oligarchy. Since the turn of the century , members of the oligarchy had ruled from 
their positions on the many nonelected boards and commissions which govern major areas like 
the port , the lakefront, sewerage and water, and the city debt. In 1979 Morial took on the Board 
of Liquidation, City Debt, which was self-perpetuating, by encouraging a lawsuit to end the 
board's "racially restr ictive membership. " The judge ruled against the board, nullified its last 
two appointments, and ordered the board to make a good-faith effort in considering a non-white 
(Hirsch, 1992b: 19). By the time Morial left office, most of the major boards and commissions 
had at least one black member. Throughout his term in office Morial br istled at the 
independence of the boards and commissions while he urged them to work in tandem with the 
city administration to improve the area 's economy. 
A major emphasis of the Moria l administration was enhancing the economic development 
of the city. Morial continued the Landr ieu success in attracting large amounts of federa l funds to 
the city. He created a new Office of Federal Programs and Special Projects to creatively use 
federal funds to tackle major urban prob lems, and established the city's first professionally 
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staffed Office of Economic Development to develop and implement an economic development 
strategy for the city as a whole. Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) were used to 
augment downtown development as well as neighborhood revitalization (Young 1984). While he 
continued to support the large-scale tourism begun under the Landrieu administration, Morial also 
tried to diversify the economy by creating the infrastructure for a manufacturing base through the 
development of the Almonaster-Michoud Industrial District. As Morial said, "we can ill 
afford. . .to alone remain the hotel-keepers and waiters for well-heeled tourists" (as quoted in 
Hirsch 1992b:29). 
Morial tr ied to encourage the city to pay its own way, realizing that the federal and state 
aid on which the city depended was rapidly drying up. He introduced a number of local revenue 
measures in an attempt to resolve the growing fiscal crisis. However, none of the more 
progressive measures passed . The drop in federal and state funds was dramatic. In 1978, 57 
percent of the city's annual operating budget came from federal and state funds; by 1982, only 30 
percent were from those sources. During Morial's term in office , city employment dropped by 
one-third . Morial said that his greatest disappointment in office was his failure to come up with 
an adequate revenue base. 
Morial's 1982 re-election campaign was a very bitter one which centered around what 
was termed his "arrogant personality ." Many in the black community thought Morial was called 
"arrogant" by the white elite simply because he sought to assert the rights of blacks in the socio­
political life of the community. Thus blacks voted for Mor ial in droves . He was re-elected in 
1982 with 99 percent of the black vote (and the endorsement of most black political 
organizations) and 14 percent of the white vote. After his re-election, Morial found himself 
besieged by the "Gang of Five" on the City Council , which had the power to blunt his initiatives 
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and override his vetoes . This anti-Morial coalition included COUP's Barthelemy and Lambert 
Boissiere, as well as three whites: Bryan Wagner , Michael Early and Wayne Babovich." In an 
attempt to regain greater contro l and lose his lame duck status, Moria l twice tried unsuccessfully 
to change the City Charter's limitation to two successive four-year terms as mayor. 
In sum, Morial's impact on blacks included increasing the number of blacks on the 
municipal workforce (from 40 percent in 1977 to 53 percent in 1985); appointing more blacks as 
heads of city departments, including the first black chief administrative officer and the first black 
police chief; and issuing two executive orders that mandated the percent of minority labor force 
participation in all city financed/administered projects and specified a goal for minority 
subcontracting participation (see Perry and Stokes, 1987).5 Morial's biggest impact, however, 
was in having a black person occupying the mayor's office: it was a source of pr ide for blacks, 
and an opportunity for whites to come to grips with the changing political landscape. 
Barthelemy's Term in Office (1986-90) 
With Mor ial unable to run for a third term of office, the 1985-86 mayora l campaign 
pitted two major black candidates against each other: City Councilman-at-Iarge Sidney 
Barthelemy and State Senator William Jefferson (Feeney and Katz, 1985). Of Creole heritage, 
Barthelemy grew up in the heart of the Creole 7th Ward. He began his career in public service 
as head of the city Welfare Department during Moon Landrieu's administration. With the 
support of COUP, in 1974 he became the first black state senator since Reconstruction. He 
became the city ' s first black councilman-at-Iarge in 1978 and was re-elected in 1982. While on 
the council, he waged a continual battle with Mor ia!. Some suggest that Barthe lemy, unhappy 
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that Morial had beat him in becoming the city ' s first black mayor , did his best to make life 
difficult for Morial as mayor. Barthelemy entered the campaign as the front-runner. 
Jefferson had a decidedly non-Creole backgro und, having grown up in northeast 
Louisiana in a poor , rural family. In 1976 he became the founding partner in what is still the 
city's most successful black law firm. In 1979 he was elected to the state Senate from uptown 
New Orleans, defeating a 16-year , white incumbent. While he and his law partners supported 
Morial in his 1977 mayoral campaign, in the 1982 campaign Jefferson ran against Morial and 
received only 7 percent of the votes , mostly from affluent whites Uptown.6 Shortly after the 
election, Jefferson and Morial reached a detente and shared a "peaceful co-existence." 
In the 1986 mayoral campaign Morial backed Jefferson in what he viewed as his best 
chance to beat Barthelemy. Morial's support helped Jefferson to run first in the primary among a 
field of three major candidates (the other candidate was Sam LeBlanc, a white attorney and 
former state representative, who ran as a "white hope" candidate) . In the runoff, however , 
Jefferson lost to Barthelemy, 42 percent (67,698 votes) to 58 percent (93,049). Jefferson won in 
the predominantly black wards, but Barthelemy took the majority white wards and predominantly 
white wards (Time Picayune, March 2, 1986, p. 1). Thus Barthe lemy won the election because 
he had the overwhel ming major ity of the white vote (85 percent) and a significant minor ity of the 
black vote (30 percent). Whites, who turned out to vote in slightly larger numbers than blacks, 
cast the pivotal votes in Barthelemy 's election. In Barthelemy, white New Orleans had found 
itself a black mayor it could live with. The white vote for Barthelemy was also seen as a vote 
against Morial and what was viewed as his arrogance. Morial's endorsement of Jefferson helped 
him in the black community but probably cost him some white votes ." 
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The issues in the campaign seemed to center more around style than substance. 
Barthelemy' s campaign theme was unity and harmony as he pledged "to bring this divided city 
together ," to get people of all races and socio-economic backgrounds to work together to improve 
New Orleans. In his inaugural address Barthelemy promised to "unite with the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Business Council of New Orleans, with the World Trade Center , with the City 
Council, and with others to expand the commercial and industrial base of this region. . . .It is only 
by working together that we will attain our maximum potential" (Times Picayune, May 6, 1986, 
p. A8). Conspicuously missing from his address was any hint of a pr imary role for the office of 
the mayor in forging this new vision for the city. 
Barthelemy' s biggest challenges upon taking office were the slump in the economy and 
the fiscal crisis. The February 1986 figures showed unemployment in the New Orleans area was 
11.1 percent (Times-Picayune, May 4, 1986, p. 1). The deficit was $30 million, which 
threatened to cripple the city. With the city council's cooperation , the Barthelemy administration 
developed a plan that slowly chipped away at and finally eliminated the deficit (by cutting costs , 
raising fees, privatizing some operations and gaining cooperation from private group s and some 
boards and commissions; but in the process 1,200 city workers were laid off). During his first 
term he was unable to create a permanent revenue base for the city, and his major revenue 
generators -- a lottery and European-style casino for New Orleans -- were not endorsed by the 
business community or passed by the legislature. His relationship with pro-reform Governor 
Buddy Roemer was rocky at best as Barthelemy sought to stabilize state funding to the city. 
Barthe lemy has said that he is less concerned with raising taxes than he is in creating new jobs. 
To that end he spent a great deal of effort during his first term trying to attract investors and 
foster better relations with local business leaders . 
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The mayor continued to stress the importance of tour ism to the city. He is credited with 
playing a key role in luring the 1988 Republican National Convention to the city, getting voters 
to approve a millage increase for a $40 million aquar ium and riverfront park (see below) , and 
getting the funds and land necessary for expansion of the New Orleans Convention Center. He 
also shepherded through plans for a $40 million reta il distribution center in eastern New Orleans 
(furthering former Mayor Moria l's vision of the Almonaster-Michoud Industrial Park). On the 
other hand, the Barthelemy administration has witnessed a number of economic setbacks: the 
relocation of about 80 percent of the Amoco Production Company's New Orleans office to 
Houston, resulting in a loss of 850 jobs in the city; the loss of the space shuttle contract to 
Huntsville; and the closing of a 140-year-old retail establishment on the major retail thoroughfare 
downtown. 
While the mayor is not blamed for these setbacks as such, he has been criticized for not 
art iculating a coherent vision for where he wants to take the city in the 1990s. Other groups not 
contro lled by City Hall, both public and pr ivate, have been left to chart the city 's course (see 
below) . At the same time, these groups have sought and received public resources to further 
their visions. The administration has continued to operate in a crisis mode, assembling plans as 
issues arise , instead of anticipating prob lems and working potential solutions into an overall 
strategy. 
Barthelemy has been quite successful , however , in the traditional political job of 
distributing patronage. Among the dominant black political groups, he has strengthened the 
fortunes of his organization, COUP, and maintained good relations with the SOUL group. He 
quickly moved to take control of patronage-rich city agencies, like the Housing Authority of New 
Orleans (HANO), the Regional Transit Authority (a law recently passed now enables the mayor 
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to name five of the eight RTA commissioners), the New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority 
(NOEHA), and the Aviation Board." Relations with the Sewerage and Water Board (S & WB) 
have been relatively smooth, so much so that the S & WB agreed in 1988 to collect an $8 service 
charge for the city . 
Barthelemy has scored points in other narrowly political areas, too. He has had some 
success with the city's unions, playing a role in reso lving a dockwo rker's strike in 1986 and a 
threatened walkout by RTA bus drivers in 1987 (both groups having largely black membership). 
He has also kept members of the police and fire departments from actualizing their many threats 
of a job action. He increased his popularity among black voters ear ly in his administration when 
he ordered city work crews out on a Saturday morning in February 1987 to remove barricades 
erected by the Jeffe rson Parish Sheriff s Office which blocked access for a predominantly black 
neighborhood in New Orleans into an adjoining predominantly white Jefferson Parish 
neighborhood. Many in the black neighborhoods said racism was behind the barricades , which 
Jefferson officials said were meant to deter cr ime. Barthelemy has been credited with winning 
approval for the aquarium millage (see below) and a tax increase for the public libraries. 
However , during his first term he was not able to get voters to approve a $195 property serv ice 
charge , a 12 mill property tax increase for police, fire and ambulance serv ices, or the Governor 's 
fiscal reform package (see below) . 
Although he has been successful in a number of areas , charges of ineptitude still follow 
him. Business leaders have complained that the mayor ' s office is not forceful enough in solving 
the city's major problems , especially the fiscal crisis. In response to the perceived need for more 
dynamic leadership, several new groups have formed and become major actors in the economic 
development life of the city. Barthelemy's style of leadership has facilitated the appearance of 
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these groups, groups which have encouraged the fashioning of a regime that is more corporate in 
its approach. 
Consensus Seeking Para-apparatuses and the Urban Regime 
For years New Orleans was known as one of the last cities in the United States where an 
old, long-established social aristocracy still controlled politics and business. Under Landrieu and 
Morial, that aristocracy's hold on politics was lessened, as new political actors came to the scene. 
Partic ipation by blacks in the electoral arena helped make the new politics possible. Morial tried 
to forge a partnership between the public and private sectors , with the Office of the Mayor 
playing a major role in developing the vision of where that partnership was to take the city (see 
Economic Development Strategy, 1978). During the Barthelemy years the old aristocracy is 
losing its grip on the business world , as recent corporate newcomers to the community carve 
significant economic and social niches for themselves. In the process of becoming the new 
leaders (consensus seekers), these members of the pr ivate sector are beginning to articulate a 
vision for the city. It is a vision that has little input from the public sector , especially City Hall. 
When he was first elected mayor , Barthelemy said he felt it was important for the private sector 
to take the lead in creating the economic development initiatives for the city, and that happened 
during his first term. 
The Business Council and the New Corporate Leadership 
The group which has played a key role in taking the initiative and fashioning a vision for 
the city is the Business Council, a coalition of corporate leaders which formed in late 1985. The 
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group' s vaguely stated mission is to boost economic development of the region by working to 
reform state and local fiscal policies, improve education and otherwise enhance the quality of 
local life. The group's first major project was to provide City Hall with $250,000 in order to 
save the city from having to close its libraries in the face of a fiscal shortfall in 1986 (Times­
Picayune, April 7, 1986, p. 1). The money enabled the city to keep six of its branch libraries 
open for six months. During that time the Business Council worked with the mayor to get voters 
to approve a millage increase which allowed all the libraries to reopen . 
Late in 1986 the Business Counci l spun off a new organization, the Council for Fiscal 
Reform , which set its task as revamping Louisiana's antiquated and inefficient budget and tax 
systems. The council made presentations around the state , trying to convince citizens and the 
legislature alike that Louisiana had to broaden its tax base (by shifting some of the tax burden 
from business to consumers/individuals) and revise its spending habits , or else the state would go 
bankrupt. During the gubernatorial campaign of 1987, Buddy Roemer endorsed the council' s 
fiscal plan and, after being elected governor, convinced the legislature to put a modified version 
of the plan before the voters. The package was defeated on April 29, 1989, by voters who 
brid led at the prospects of higher taxes. The final count showed 548,297, or 55 percent, of the 
voters opposed, and 448,363 voters in support of the proposal, which was on the ballot in the 
form of a constitutional amendment (Times-Picayune, Apr il 30, 1989, p. 1). 
Roemer's tax-restructur ing plan failed because it did not win the support of blacks and 
blue-collar whites -- the groups the governor said would benefit the most, from lower taxes and 
increased jobs. In New Orleans the plan won by a mere 150 votes: 53,085 (50 perce nt) to 
52,935. The plan lost narrowly among black voters in New Orleans, many of whom did not vote 
at all, despite the support of Mayor Sidney Barthelemy and former Mayor Dutch Morial. Black 
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proponents of the plan argued that the plan would benefit the black poor through lower sales 
taxes, and in the large number of jobs that would be created from the infrastructure projects to be 
funded by the program. The plan was opposed by State Senator William Jefferson, who said it 
would provide few jobs , lead to larger state deficits, and mostly benefit a handful of the state's 
largest corporations (Times Picayune, April 6, 1989, p. 8). 
The defeat of Fiscal Reform in 1989 did not deter the Business Council from remaining 
involved in the affairs of New Or leans. After the defeat, however , the Business Council had a 
greater appreciation of the need to get public support for their plans . In the fall of 1988 the 
council announced its intention to create a "master economic action" plan to revitalize the New 
Orleans economy (Finn , 1988). The council said it was up to the business community to draw 
the political, professional and economic leaders together to agree on an action-based plan. The 
plan would build on New Orleans ' strengths: tour ism, the port , medical centers and the 
fractured-but-still-sizable remnants of the oil and gas industry . The group did not envision 
gathering large-scale public input. Rather , as the plan developed, the group would bounce 
proposals off leaders from various segments of the community. 
After the defeat of Fiscal Reform , the Business Council decided to include leaders from a 
broad segment of the community in creating the plan now called Metrovision. Citizen focus 
groups were now added as part of the planning process , and a conscious effort was made to 
recruit widely for representatives from various groups , including groups representing the black 
community. Input from these groups was encouraged . A media component was also added. 
These two new areas of focus (citizen input and media) can be seen as an attempt by the Business 
Council to educate the public about the economic development needs of the community. The 
effort paid off, for in the fall of 1990, a portion of the Fiscal Reform package (the infrast ructure 
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improvements program) went before the electorate and passed handily in the state and in New 
Orleans. Metrovision had not only served to articulate a plan for the development of the area but 
had also served to foster a consensus on a major element of the Business Council ' s long-range 
plans. 
Business Council leader ship has come from corporate newcomers to the city. The first 
head of the Business Council was James "Jim Bob" Moffett, chairman and CEO of Freeport­
McMoran (a diversified exp loration and production company), who had impressed the local 
business community by moving his Fortune 500 company from its New York headquarters to 
New Orleans (Times-Picayune, May 18, 1989 , p. D l). His brand of "Texas-style civic 
evangelism" took the city by storm as he campaigned relentlessly for fiscal reform, as well as the 
other programs of the council. 
With the Business Council at the helm, it has become obvious that there is an emerging 
busines s leadership in the city. In many of the recent projects the mayor 's role has been that of a 
spokesman for the city (e.g . , attracting the Republican National Convention), while the planning 
has come from the pri vate sector. Yet there has been little discussion in the city about the 
declining role of government. As government is urged to become more like a business, there is 
little being said about the fact that business and government have different functions to per form. 
The changing relationship between the public and private sectors during the Barthelemy 
administration can perhaps best be seen through a discussion of the Audubon Park Commission's 
aquar ium project, to which we now turn. 
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The Audubon Park Commission and the Aquarium 
During Morial's administration there was an attempt to strip the mayor of his authority 
over the Audubon Park Commission (APC), which governed the Uptown park, the zoo and, at 
the time, the whites-only golf club (Hirsch, 1992b:39-42) . The APC's 24 appointees were 
named by the mayor with City Council approval. In 1982, the Friends of the Zoo (a pr ivate 
corporation) and their allies on the APC sought state legislation to regionalize membersh ip of the 
APC and give control of the park and zoo to the state, with members appointed by the governor. 
The state passed reorganization legislation in 1982 and again in 1983, but Morial challenged the 
legislation in court successfully. Speaking of the proposed state takeover, Sal Anselmo, Morial' s 
city attorney, said "... [It] is an effort to keep blacks from getting any contro l of the Zoo 
Commission" (Hirsch, 1992b:42). The APC also began to push for zoo and park employees to 
be taken out of civil service. 
Under the Barthelemy administration, relations between the APC and the mayor's office 
have been very smooth. Many of the APC's leaders were also Barthelemy backers in the 1986 
mayoral campaign. Some of APC's ear lier goals are being realized, including privatization of 
some aspects of the APC and the exemption of zoo and park employees from civil service. The 
impetus for both of these changes was the riverfront aquarium in downtown New Orleans, 
developed by the APC and fully backed by Barthelemy. The aquar ium opened in 1990. 
Barthelemy has called the aquarium project the centerpiece of his economic development 
plan, a plan that stresses the pr imacy of tourism. According to the mayor's office, the aquarium 
project is expected to do for the downtown riverfront what the Superdome did for the Poydras 
Street area in the 1970s, when it served as a catalyst for $3 billion of new construction 
downtown. Stressi ng increased tourism, jobs and economic vitality, the backers of the project -­
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the Audubon Park Commission -- pulled together a rare consensus of community support. That 
support included the entire City Council, the Business Council and the Chamber of Commerce, 
the NAACP and Urban League , the tour ism industry and riverfront developers . The small 
amount of opposi tion that surfaced had to do with the site of the project -- along the riverfront on 
the edge of the French Quarter , rather than with the project itself. Preservationists were against 
the site because they felt its scale would harm the character of the Quarter . Merchants within the 
heart of the Quarter (i.e., along Bourbon and Royal streets) feared the increasing competition 
from businesses along the riverfront. The response of Ron Forman , the executive director of the 
Audubon Park Commission, was that "the bigger issue is the survival of the city, not the survival 
of some particular merchants" (City Business, September 1, 1986, p. 1). 
The project was presented to the public as a major element in the city's economic 
recovery . The $40 million aquarium promised 250 ,000 additional tourists annually (for a total of 
860,000 visitors a year), 1,000 jobs (250 permanent jobs and 750 construction jobs), and an 
overall economic input of $53 million a year. The project was financed by a combination of 
public and pr ivate funds . Fifteen million dollars came from pr ivate sources , mainly from 
riverfro nt developers , oil companies and other corporate sponsors. The chairman of the Business 
Council headed the fund-raising committee. The city prov ided $25 million, through bonds 
financed by a 3.8 millage increase in property taxes. Charges that the millage is excessive and 
will likely create massive patronage -- the 3.8 mills will generate almost double what is needed a 
year for debt service, and the term of the millage is almost twice as long as what is needed to 
retire the debt serv ice -- were dismissed by the public (City Business, May 25, 1987, p. 1). The 
referendum on the millage increase passed handily , with 70 percent in favor. Blacks, a key to 
the success of the referendum , turned out to vote on the promise that jobs were to be created. 
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On the night of the election Barthelemy said the results meant "we' ll get some black folks back to 
work" (Times-Picayune, November 5 , 1986, p. 1). 
The campaign organ izers worked hard to gain black support. They made media 
presentations to black groups, including over 60 black ministers . They highlighted the aquarium 
legislation' s guarantee of minority participation in 20 percent of construction work , 30 percent of 
all jobs , and 30 percent of all suppliers. The campaign worked , for black support was higher 
than white support, as blacks urgently felt the need for more jobs to be created (Times-Picayune , 
November 6, 1986, p. 7) . 
Blacks monitored the aquarium project carefully . A full-time person was hired to assist 
minority businesses to bid construction work and to fill job openings. To date , the goals of 
minor ity participation have been met. However, in the beginning things did not run smooth ly. 
When the director of the APC, Ron Forman , named a three-member design team to coord inate 
the project, the black community cried out that there were no blacks on the design team. Within 
several weeks , two black architectural firms were added to the design team. Roger Ogden , then 
chairman of the aquarium oversight committee, called it "an historic moment in the social and 
economic structure of our city" (Times-Picayune , February 27, 1987, p. B-2). 
In March 1988 the Audubon Park Commission created the Audubon Institute , a pr ivate, 
non-profit organization that would hire employees and manage the daily operations of the 
aquarium (Times-Picayune, March 22, 1988, p. B-1). The institute is also responsible for 
supervisi ng marketing, fund-raising, concess ions, and educational programs. The commission 
continues to make decis ions related to spending, design and construction , and long-range plans . 
The new institute is designed to allow for the hiring of the best-qualified personnel , without the 
constraints of civil service. Forman said the new structure will allow them to run the aquarium 
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like a business rather than in the traditional governme nt manner. The institute is composed of 
the present Friends of the Zoo, which handles some management duties and fund-raising at the 
Audubon Zoo, and a new group, the Fr iends of the Aquarium. All employees of the APC were 
given the option of working directly for the institute or staying under Civil Service; about 80 
percent opted for the former , given the promise of higher salaries . 
With the development of the new aquarium and the continued enhancement of the 
Audubon Zoo, the APC will continue to play a significant role in the growing family-oriented 
tour ist industry in New Orleans . The director of the aquarium and the zoo, Ron Forman, has 
proven to be a highly successful development entrepreneur. He is credited with having changed 
the zoo from a foul-smelling facility to one of the premier small zoos in the nation. (For a more 
detailed discussion of the Zoo , see Whelan and Dupont, 1986.) More than anyone else, he sold 
the idea of an aquarium to the New Orleans public. He worked behind the scenes, with "no 
formal planning process," to get the riverfront site at the foot of Canal Street selected for the 
aquar ium. That site responded to the needs of riverfront developers who needed to tie in the 
pedestr ian link between two major riverfront projects. The aquarium project filled their needs 
and they in turn became major supporters of the project. Others in the city, especially blacks, 
were encouraged to support the project because of the jobs promised. Along the way, Forman 
has become one of the foremost development entrepreneurs in the city. 
As the example of the aquarium project showed, consensus seeking para-apparatuses, in 
this case quasi-public development organizations, are extremely important actors in the New 
Orleans regime. In particular , some of the more autonomous agencies have emerged as activists 
in the would-be corporate regime. Leading development actors have developed autonomous 
power bases . 
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By looking at New Orleans over the past 20 years, we have seen that the issue of race 
influences the type of regime that is developed . With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, large numbers of blacks became available to be incorporated into an electoral coalition. 
Incorporation entailed responding to the needs of the black community , as articulated by the 
leaders of the newly formed black political organizations. The needs centered around expanding 
services and generating greater resources, needs that were unlikely to be provided by the kind of 
caretaker regime that New Orleans had known historically. Thus , with the incorporation of large 
numbers of blacks into the electoral arena, the stage was set for the creat ion of a corporate 
regime. It is a process that has been developing for the past 20 years , and has seen the election 
of two black mayors, both of whom come from Creole backgrounds. 
The dilemma facing the emerging governing coalition in New Orleans was how to appear 
progressive in addressing the needs of the black community and yet meet the needs of the major 
business interests. The solution in New Orleans, as elsewhere , was to stress the creation of jobs 
and black business involvement. Start ing with Landrieu, the influx of federal dollars (first anti­
poverty dollars and later economic development dollars) made it poss ible for some of the needs 
of the black community (or at least those of its leaders) to be met. Both Landrieu and Morial 
tried to use the mayor 's office to refashion the city, and both used promises of jobs generated by 
federally financed programs to garner black support. By the time Barthelemy was elected mayor , 
federal dollars were no longer available for economic development and the mayor had to rely 
even more heavily on private dollars to fuel the economy and, in the process , create the kinds of 
resources that could be used to garner black support . 
With the changing economic fortunes of the city, the kinds of symbolic overtures to the 
black community also changed. During Morial's administration, there was much more emphasis 
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on bringing blacks into the mainstream of all facets of society and of making the mayor the 
spokesman for the newly incorporated . So sure was Morial of his appea l to the black community 
that he was willing (and able) to bypass the black political organization during his first mayoral 
campaign. His combative nature in advocating on behalf of their rights brought Morial strong 
support from many blacks. Barthelemy's message has been to bring the commu nity together 
again, but the emphasis has been on reassuring whites that they still have a major ro le to play in 
the development of the city. It was a message that did not play well in the black community 
until, in his second mayoral election, he faced a white opponent. Then the black community 
rallied to his side in order to be sure of keeping a black person in the mayor's office. 
Barthelemy has used his access to patronage to reward blacks, especially the black political 
groups, but his symbol ic overtures to blacks have been kept low-key. His overtures have been to 
the white corporate community, and he has served to facilitate their vision for the redeve lopment 
of the city , not fashion one of his own. 
The interracial politics of New Or leans is familiar to most black-majority cities . What is 
unique about New Or leans is the intra-racial politics between blacks of a Creole heritage and 
those of an Americanized heritage. The two major black polit ical organizations that were started 
in the mid-1960s reflected the split: COUP for Creoles, SOUL for other blacks. Landrieu had to 
be careful to compensate each group equally for its support , and thus as resources started flowing 
into the black community, they were fractured along ethnic lines. This bifurcation within the 
political arena is also reflected within the social arena, and thus the black community comes 
together in reaction to events, such as a white candidate running against a black one (as with 
Morial in the 1977 and 1982 and Barthelemy in 1990) , but not in being as proactive to events 
around them as they might be. For instance , when Jefferson (with SOUL's backing) ran against 
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Barthelemy (with COUP's backing) in 1986, there was no black group to suggest that they not 
run against each other, for each was representing a different part of the community. Resources 
are thus diluted and blacks find it that much harder to speak with a united voice to the governing 
coalition. 
Conclusion: Toward A Theoretically Reconstructed Urban Regime Theory 
A theoretically reconstructed urban regime theory must begin by interpreting the specifics 
of urban regimes in the context of higher- level theoretical abstractions. In our case, we find 
Clark and Dear's (1984) abstractions focusing on the state apparatus particularly useful, for they 
prov ide for insightful interpretation without a priori determinism. The state apparatus refers to a 
complex of mechanisms through which state power is exercised . According to Clark and Dear 
(1984:43) , the operationalized objectives of the state are: 1) to secure social consensus; 2) to 
secure the cond itions of production; and 3) to secure social integration, especially of the 
subordinate classes. They develop a taxonomy of the state apparatus based on sub-apparatuses 
determined by the "collection of agencies, organ izations, and institutions which constitute the 
means by which (specific) state functions are attained" (1984:49). They locate the local state 
(govern ing coalition) as part of the consensus seeking political sub-apparatus of the state. The 
problem with this conceptua lization is that while it allows for connections at the abstract level, it 
is not useful in making the sought-after but elusive connections between higher-level abstractions 
and empirical reality (see Lauria, 1985 for a critical review of this interpretive framewo rk) . On 
the one hand, contrary to Cox (1991a,b), this is precise ly where we find the "new urban politics" 
literature so useful. But at the same time, we agree with Cox that this literature suffers from not 
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making explicit connections to the higher-level abstractions found in the "political economy of 
the state" literature. 
As stated in the introduction, we see as a telling weakness in Stone's urban regime 
typology its undertheorization in terms of the relationships between the structure of the electoral 
coalition, the structure of the governing coalition (both public and private), and the stabi lity of 
the regime. This is part icular ly apparent since regime theory has yet to specify the ro le of racial 
politics in governing coalitions that maintain urban reg imes." This is not a minor omission, for 
the black electorate will have an increasing role in urban politics for the expected future. Our 
case study is illustrative. At different times, New Orleans has seemed to be each of the three 
regime types delineated by Stone. Certainly, through much of its history, New Or leans politics 
were dominated by a caretaker regime. 10 The period from the 1930s to 1970 can be broadly 
characterized as a caretaker regime, with the exception of a brief reformist thrus t in the early 
years of the Morrison administration (the late 1940s) (see Harris , 1974) . 
Occasionally , there has been some evidence of prog ressive forces in New Or leans. Most 
notably, this happened when preservationists and neighborhood groups banded together to stop 
the construction of the Riverfront Expressway in the 1960s. Although to some degree , the early 
years of the Morial administration can be viewed as a prog ressive reg ime, the 1970s and early 
1980s saw a different sort of regime emerging. The reigning electora l coal ition during the 
Landrieu and Morial administration was that of the overwhelming majority of black voters , and a 
minority of white voters . The ironic aspect of the black electorate is that it has a tendency to 
support either a progressive regime or a corporate regime: a caretaker reg ime is very difficu lt to 
maintain in a city with a recent majority black electorate. The progress ive regime histor ically 
courted the black electorate symbolically, ideologically, and through redistr ibutive policies. 
26 
Given the intensification of the fiscal crisis of the state, the prospects of jobs and minor ity 
contracts within a pro-growth strategy have become more seductive. This changing structure of 
the electorate and changing political patronage system helped pave the way for the emergence of 
a corporate regime. Ultimately, mayors Landrieu and Mor ial pursued policies which also headed 
the city towards a corporate regime. Following Reed (1988), "really existing" black urban 
governments adhere to a corporatist/pro-growth framework for the same reasons that white-
dominated ones have. Accord ing to Reed, 
it seems reasonable and proper ideologically, conforms to a familiar sense of 
rationality , and pro mises to deliver practical, empirical benefits. . . .the interests to 
which the reg ime is most attentive are included among the framework' s 
beneficiar ies... .They are by and large only black versions of the prog rowth 
regimes that they have replaced , distinguished in part by the asymmetry of their 
campaign rhetor ic and their practice of governance. They are in one sense even 
more attractive as junior members in the progro wth coalition because of their 
peculiar skill at derailing opposition to development initiatives and cultivating the 
loyalty or acquiescence of the growth machine' s victims (1988).
 
The election of Sidney Barthelemy in 1986 brought a different political coalition to City
 
Hall. Barthelemy was elected by a minority of black voters , and an overwhelming majority of 
white voters. By and large, this electoral coalition is reminiscent of the caretaker regime of 
earlier years. Many of his white supporters may have wanted low taxes and low levels of 
government activity. But the low level of activity at City Hall opened the door for the growing 
corporate leadership and the development entrepreneurs to play a more explicit role in 
strengthening a pro-growth coalition. Since blacks were mainly concerned with the rewards of 
city government -- patronage positions, contracts, etc. -- they were co-opted into becoming 
willing part icipants in the electoral coalition through Barthe lemy's adroit handling of their 
concerns. By the time of his re-election in 1990 (against a white opponent), Barthelemy won with 
86 percent of the black vote and 23 percent of the white vote (see Whelan and Young, 1992, p. 142). 
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Urban regime theory , and typologies in general, are by their conception static and thus 
not helpful in explicating transitions within the larger schema, or in our case the emergence of 
new regime. It is our contention that for a corporate regime to emerge (either from a progressive 
or caretaker one), it must rely on the development of consensus seeking para-apparatuses 
concerned with economic development to gain political strength. In recent years, business­
dominated groups (especially the Business Council) have tried to transform the New Orleans 
governi ng coalition into a vigorous corporate regime. The creation of the Business Counci l and 
its offshoot, the Council for Fiscal Reform (see Miron, 1992), marks a transformation in the role 
of large mobile capital in the New Orleans governing coalition. The first two chairmen of the 
Business Counci l are major corporate CEOs. The Business Council has been aided in its efforts 
by several dynamic development entrepreneurs in quasi-public agencies with some autonomy, 
who share its aims. 
The leaders of these consensus seeking para-apparatuses all exemplify innovative 
development entrepreneurs. Like their counterparts in other communities (Times-Picayune, July 
15 , 1987, p. 1; Times-Picayune, May 18, 1986, p. A-1) they are activists who would like to see 
a corporate regime dominate in New Orleans. They want the kinds of achievements in tourism, 
the port , and economic development that other communities have demonstrated. 
In contrast, the heads of the city's functional bureaucracies have not shown the same kind 
of entrepreneur ial leadersh ip. By and large, in a time of fiscal scarcity, the heads of city 
departments have been reactive. In considering the land use alliance, it is noteworthy that the 
City Planning Commission has been rather compliant in recent years on development issues (see 
case studies in Doig and Hargrove, 1987; Doig, 1987; and Caro, 1974 for counter examples). 
On a number of controversial matters (e.g . , the siting of the new aquarium on the French Quarter 
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waterfront, expans ion on the French Quarter riverfront), the commiss ion has sided with 
developers instead of environmentalists and preservationists who opposed the scope of the site of 
the development. 11 
The new business leadership coalition dovetails well with Barthelemy's vision of the role 
of city government. Although Barthelemy believes that economic development planning and 
initiatives should come from the private sector, a problem arises when public action is necessary 
to support private development. This is especially the case when the approval of voters is 
required. Then the active involvement of the political leader is needed in order to galvanize the 
voters through promises of benefits to come. In the process , the governing regime moves toward 
a more corporate orientation. 
In conclusion, what have we added to urban regime theory? First we have embedded it, 
for interpretation and specification purposes, within the framework of higher-level abstractions 
concerning the form, function , and mechanisms of the state in a capitalist social formation. This 
aided us in explicating the emergence of a corporate regime in New Orleans. It helped us 
unders tand the ro le of quasi-public development agencies as consensus seeking para-apparatuses 
of the newly emerging corpo rate governi ng coalition. At the same time, it highl ights the 
political role, in contrast to the more explicit economic role, these organ izations have within the 
new regime. Second , we have argued that the changing structure of an electoral coalition has 
much to say about the likely stability of a governing regime. In our case, we focused on racial 
politics and the development of a majority black electorate. While we argue that the complexity 
of racial politics in New Orleans leads to perplexing political coalitions based on specific heritage 
and class, we also argue that it is difficult for a caretaker regime to maintain the support of a 
black electorate. Given the historical legacy of the black population in the United States in 
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general and New Orleans in particu lar , the overwhelming majority of the black population are 
low-income renters. This is not likely to be a stable political base of a caretaker regime. While 
it can be the political base of a progressive regime, and was in many urban areas during the 
influx of federal dollars, given the fiscal crisis of the state at all levels of government , it is more 
likely that the black electorate can be seduced with promises of trickle-down jobs fostered by a 
corporate-led pro-growth coalition. At the same time, such a governi ng coalition is politically 
and economically attractive to the small but influential black middle class. This is what we see 
happening in New Or leans in the 1990s. 
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Endnotes 
1.	 This is not a cr iticism; Cox has been active in these debates and has researched at the nexus 
of the new urban politics and locality studies (see Cox and Mair 1988, 1989a,b). It is 
interesting to note that the new locality and regional focus in geography and the new urban 
politics in political science were generated, at least explicitly, in reaction to what some 
believe to have been a scientific imperial threat from economics represented by the rise of 
political economic perspectives in both disciplines (from both Marxian and/or Chicago 
School roots). There are countless examples of disciplinary scholars in essence proclaiming 
that "see we are an important discipline; politics (or read geography) matters." 
2.	 From their rejoinders , it appears that Stone (1991) and Fainstein (1991) agree with Cox on 
this point; where they appear to disagree is with his real ist epistemology (after Sayer , 1984) 
and Marxian rooted theoretical predisposition represented here. 
3.	 During Landrieu ' s term in office , a number of political offices were won by blacks, all of 
whom were Landrieu allies and their victor ies were a direct resu lt of his backing. In 1972 
Robert Collins became the first black federal judge in the "Deep South" Eastern District. 
In 1973, Edwin Lombard was elected Clerk of Court, the first black parochial (parish-wide) 
official since Reconstruction. In 1974 Sidney Barthelemy became the first black state senator 
elected in a century. In 1976 Rev. A.L. Davis became the first black city councilman when 
the other councilmen at Landrieu 's urging named him to an unexpired term. The next year , 
Sidney Barthelemy became the first black city councilman-at-Iarge. James Singleton beat 
Davis for a seat as a district councilman. 
4.	 The seven-member City Council did not become majority black until 1985, when Babovich 
was forced to res ign and Ulysses Williams was named in his place. In 1986 the Council had 
an elected black majority . 
5.	 During Morial's administration , from the time the execut ive orders on set-asides went into 
effect in September 1984 to April 1986, the amount of contracts awarded to minorities 
include: construction, $13.4 million; personal and professional services, $1.6 million; and 
set-asides, $2.1 million (Rice, 1986). During Barthelemy's term, from April 1986 to 
September 1988, the amount of contracts awarded to minorities include: construction $31 
million; professional services , $20 million, and set-asides , $16.5 million (Office of Minority 
Business Deve lopment City of New Orleans) . 
6.	 Jefferson ran in 1982 because he felt that Mor ial was vulnerabl e in both the black and white 
communities. There was a large pocket of black dissatisfact ion, expecially following the 
killing of three blacks by police officers in the Algiers neighborhood, and the fact that black 
political organizations felt that they were being ignored by Morial (Jefferson had strong ties 
with the leaders of SOUL). Therefore, Jefferson calculated that he could get a significant 
amount of the black vote. Jefferson also felt he could get white support, since he had won 
a large number of white votes in his successful campaign against a 16-year incumbent for his 
Senate seat. Jeffe rson 's calculations may have been naive to begin with , assuming he could 
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beat the city ' s first black mayor. However , when Ron Faucheaux, a white candidate, entered 
the race, Jeffe rson's strategy went awry. The blacks stayed with Morial, to make sure that 
Faucheaux did not win, and the whites went with Faucheaux. Jefferson lost with only 7 
percent of the vote. 
7.	 With 51.2 percent of the electorate black, the results of the 1986 mayoral election suggest 
that the white vote played the same role that the black vote played in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when it was the minor ity component of the electorate. Black voter turnout was relatively low 
in 1986. When blacks are faced with two viable candidates, they often turn out in lower 
numbers, since some refuse to choose between the two. 
8.	 A federal audit of the airport 's contracts completed in May 1989 was crit ical of the non­
competitive process used by the Aviation Board in awarding professional services contracts. 
These contracts, worth millions of dollars annually , tend to go to friends and political 
supporters of Barthe lemy and city council members (Times-Picayune , May 5, 1989, p.B-3). 
9.	 Interestingly and fortunately, Stone 's failure to theorize racial politics is not reflected in his 
insightful analysis (see his analysis of Atlanta 's urban regime in Stone, 1989:183-199). 
10.	 In an earlier paper on development policies in New Or leans, Whelan (1987) employed the 
regime concept. During the years from the second World War until 1970, New Orleans 
politics followed Elkin's characterization of a "pr ivatist regime." The city became involved 
in numerous federal programs, and blacks attained significant employment in city government 
for the first time (See Perry and Stokes , 1987). The Morial administration (1978-1986) 
seems somewhat akin to Elkin's description of a "federalist regime." The city achieved 
substantial resu lts in economic development by employing federal monies. At the same time, 
the city became increasingly dependent on the federal government. Blacks became the 
dominant partner in the electoral coalition. In the earlier paper (wr itten at the start of the 
Barthelemy administration), the years after 1986 were called a "post-federalism regime." In 
a review of this paper John Kincaid notes that these regimes are all keyed to mayoral 
elections. Kincaid also observes that there is not "clear specification of criteria for 
demarcating regimes" (Kincaid, 1988). Whelan would not use these categor ies now, 
preferr ing Stone's typology or corpo rate, progressive , and caretaker. 
11.	 The head of the City Planning Commission resigned in 1988 to take a position with the 
Audubon Institute. The City Planning Commission is now headed by a black for the first 
time in its history . 
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